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Habitual Drunkenness Affecting
Family Relations
James J. McGarry*
T HE GROWING SOCIAL PROBLEM of habitual intemperance fre-
quently becomes the source of litigation in a court of
Domestic Relations. The broken family seeking a solution of
social, physical, and economic dangers created by an excessive
use of alcohol by one of its members, turns to law for a remedy.
The answer all too often is found in the divorce statutes.
Habitual drunkenness is not, in the absence of a statute, a
ground for divorce.' Even if not recognized by statute, it is
sometimes shown as evidence in connection with other offenses
such as cruelty.
The state, in granting a divorce, believes that its own wel-
fare will be promoted and therefore declines to accept the posi-
tion of the medical field which identifies drunkenness as an
illness. It may be that the granting of a divorce as a matter of
public policy could not be supported if drunkenness were ac-
cepted as an illness rather than moral fault.2
No universally accepted definition of habitual drunkenness
exists among the various states which allow a divorce based on
this ground. Generally, however, the courts will consider
whether the habit has become fixed or irresistible, what effect
the intoxicants have upon the user, the frequency of intoxi-
cation, and duration and the continuity of the habit.
In an often quoted decision, the Oregon Court in defining
habitual drunkenness stated:
The man is reduced to that pitiable condition in which
he either makes no vigorous effort to resist and overcome
the habit, or his will has become so enfeebled by indulgence
that resistance is impossible. There is generated in him by
frequent and excessive indulgence a fixed habit of drunken-
ness which he is liable to exhibit at any time when the op-
portunity is afforded. He is an habitual drunkard in the
habit of getting drunk although he may not always be so.
When a man has reached such a state of demoralization that
his inebriety has become habitual, its effect upon his char-
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1 17 Am. Jur. Divorce and Separation § 150.
2 Annot., 29 A. L. R. 2d 926 (1953).
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acter and conduct is to disqualify him from properly attend-
ing to his business, and, if he be married to render his pres-
ence in the marriage relation disgusting and intolerable,
especially if he is an habitual gross drunkard.3
It is insufficient merely to show that one drinks or has be-
come drunk on several occasions.4 It must be shown that the
person charged is one who habitually and frequently becomes
drunk and he may be classified as habitually intemperate even
if his sober hours exceed his drunken hours.5
Interference with Business
The ability of a person to work or to attend to his business
is often a determining factor in deciding if the habitual intem-
perance is within the statute which allows a divorce on the
ground of drunkenness.
A California court6 held that "A fixed habit of drinking to
excess to such a degree as to disqualify a person from attending
to his business during the principal portion of the time usually
devoted to business. . ." is the habitual intemperance recognized
by the divorce statute.
So while inability to work can be an ingredient, it is not al-
ways necessary that the intemperance be so extensive as to dis-
able a person from attending to his business7 or to incapacitate
him from performing the duties of his profession or occupation.8
It is possible for one to be intemperate and not let his work
suffer.
But if the effects of alcohol render a person incompetent to
conduct his own affairs, the court may appoint a guardian either
of his person, or his property, or of both.9 The guardianship
serves as a protection where the person lacks the capacity to
prudently manage his affairs and property without risk to his
own interests and to those of his family.'0 In this way the court
can insure that the drunkard's family is adequately provided for.
3 McBee v. McBee, 22 Or. 329, 29 P. 887, 29 Am. St. Rep. 613 (1892).
4 Todd v. Todd, 56 So. 2d 441, 29 A. L. R. 2d 920 (1951).
5 Wilson v. Wilson, 128 Ark. 110, 193 S. W. 504 (1917).
6 Mahone v. Mahone, 19 Cal. 626, 81 Am. Dec. 91 (1862).
7 Richards v. Richards, 19 Ill. App. 465 (1886).
8 Tarrant v. Tarrant, 156 Mo. App. 725, 137 S. W. 56 (1911).
9 Anderson v. State, 96 P. 2d 281, 54 Ariz. 387, 126 A. L. R. 501 (1939).
10 Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 Ky. Op. 1012.
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As a general rule, unless a statute so provides, the court cannot
empower a guardian of a drunkard to dispose of his real estate
except when necessary to pay his obligations or for the main-
tenance of himself or his family.
Effect upon Family
The disturbing effects of habitual intemperance upon the
family relationship has been recognized by the courts. An Illi-
nois court said:
The reason why the law makes habitual drunkenness a
ground for divorce is not alone because it disqualifies the
husband or wife from attending to business, but in part, if
not mainly, because it renders the persons addicted thereto
unfit for the duties of the marital relation and disquali-
fies such person from properly rearing and caring for the
children born of the marriage.1
In Connecticut' 2 the reason for use of the habitual intem-
perance test as a ground for divorce was held not to be for the
purpose of promoting temperance or reforming the offender
".. . but to preserve the peace, comfort, safety, happiness, and
prosperity of the non-offending party, and of the family of which
they are together the members and parents."
Some courts are so stringent and zealous in protecting the
marriage relationship that if the habitual intemperance com-
plained of is not so great as to have created ". . . want or suffer-
ing in the family," 13 divorce will be denied notwithstanding evi-
dence of other effects resulting from over indulgence.
A parent may be deprived of his natural right to custody of
his children by his misconduct. If such misconduct is dissipation
produced by the use of intoxicants which make him utterly unfit
to have custody, or if through neglect he fails to provide for his
children, a court will feel justified in refusing him custody.14 In
a custody action the court will always regard the welfare of the
child as paramount and decide the issue in the best interests of
the child. The fact that a parent through his misconduct has
been deprived of the custody of his minor child does not relieve
him of his legal duty to support the child.
11 Richards v. Richards, supra note 7, at 469.
12 Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 36 Atl. 34, at 35 (1896).
13 Id., at 36.
14 Lally v. Fitz Henry, 85 Iowa 49, 51 N. W. 1155, 16 L. R. A. 681 (1892).
Jan., 1962
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1962
DRUNKARD AND FAMILY
Defenses
Condonation as a defense in a divorce action is applicable
to the non-continuing offenses and is not usually considered to be
applicable where the cause of action relates to offenses of a con-
tinuing nature which cannot be condoned such as permanent im-
potency or an incurable disease.
A resumption of the marital relationship, once the right to
divorce for habitual drunkenness has become complete, is con-
donation and nullifies the right to divorce, if the offender has
reformed. If the habit is resumed or continues despite promises
to the contrary, the person who previously condoned may break
off the marital relation and establish his right to divorce. 15 Gen-
erally, therefore, condonation is dependent upon the subsequent
conduct of the offender and a recurrence of the offense "...
amounts to revocation of the condonation . " 10 and revives
prior acts as grounds for divorce.
The "clean hands" doctrine of equity was applied in Todd v.
Todd17 where a husband, claiming a divorce on the ground of
habitual intemperance, bought for and gave to his wife most of
the liquor she consumed, took her to parties where alcohol was
prevalent and ". . . otherwise encouraged her to drink and kept
her eternally in a liquor environment." A complainant who thus
encourages one to be intemperate has no right in equity to a
divorce on that ground.
From the foregoing, it is not meant that one must exert his
influence to restrain the drinking habits of his spouse, or even
that one may not at times acquiesce in or participate in social
drinking.18 This would not of necessity preclude a divorce on
the grounds of the other's habitual imtemperance.
Most jurisdictions are in accord that the habitual drunken-
ness must be formed after marriage in order to grant a divorce
on the ground. 19 Even where statutory provisions do not so re-
quire, divorce still may not be granted if the other spouse was
aware that the condition existed before the marriage. To employ
premarital knowledge of habitual intoxication as a defense, the
15 Lewis v. Lewis, 75 Iowa 200, 39 N. W. 271 (1888); Cope v. Cope, 103 Mo.
App. 77 S. W. 92 (1903).
16 Wilms v. Wilms, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 128, at 130 (Ohio App. 1936).
17 Todd v. Todd, supra note 4, at 443.
18 Frye v. Frye, 245 Iowa 563, 63 N. W. 2d 242 (1954).
19 Annot., 15 A. L. R. 2d 677 (1951).
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defendant has the burden of proving that he in fact had the habit
before marriage and that his spouse was aware of it. The de-
fense is not available where there is a failure to prove these
points.20
Conclusion
Most jurisdictions recognize habitual drunkenness either as
an independent ground for divorce or consider it as a factor in
determining some other wrong. An examination of the cited
cases indicates that the drunkenness complained of must pro-
duce some adverse effect upon the family, either of a mental,
physical, or economic nature.
In an effort to protect the interests of those exposed to
habitual intemperance, the courts will not hesitate to appoint a
guardian or, where minor children are concerned, deprive the
drunkard of custody, if necessary. On the other hand, the courts,
in guarding the marital institution, will not permit a divorce
where the complainant has condoned the actions of the defend-
ant, connived to bring about the ground for dissolution of the
marriage, or where there is premarital knowledge of the intem-
perance.
With the divorce rate increasing rapidly, reliance upon
drunkenness as a ground for divorce will increase proportionally.
In the future the rules regarding habitual drunkenness should
therefore be subject to more vigorous application by the courts.
20 17 Am Jur. Divorce and Separation § 158.
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